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Gulf Finance House (GFH) is a Shariah compliant Islamic wholesale investment bank 
established in 1999 in Bahrain (Arabian Business, 2010). The company is currently 
listed on the Kuwait and Bahraini stock exchanges, the Dubai Financial Market and 
on the London Stock Exchange, and became the first Islamic investment bank in the 
Middle East to be traded on the London Stock Exchange (ArabianBusiness, 2010). 
 
The bank claims to be active in five separate lines of business: 
 
• Development infrastructur (called real estate) 
• Venture capital 
• Private Equity 
• Investment Banking 
• Asset Management 
 
GFH deals with nearly 3,000 affluent private clients and institutional investors  
(Goeksenin, 2009). Corporate growth historically was based on the origination of 
development infrastructure projects, i.e., conceiving projects on a greenfield basis and 
starting from the concept stage.  These projects were mostly related to new real estate 
developments, although there were also some industrial projects.  The areas of 
business included the GCC region, emerging markets and in the Middle East & North 
Africa (MENA) region, as well as in Europe and North America. 
 
The core business of GFH has been private equity, and most of this was in new real 
estate projects.  Looking at the GFH income statements from 2004 through 2008 it 
appears 70% of their entire business activities were solely on one form or another of 
greenfield real estate projects (Gulf Finance House, 2010)(see Appendix “Investment 
and project launches”).  
 
During its first seven years of operations, GFH launched projects and investments 
with an aggregate final value exceeding US$12 billion. Its diversified investment 
portfolio includes mega real estate developments such as the US$1.3 billion Bahrain 
Financial Harbor, the US$1.6 billion Energy City Qatar, and the US$3.8 billion 
Legends in Dubai Land. In addition, GFH has numerous funds targeting investments 
in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas (Zawya, 2010). 
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GFH was heavily involved in real estate-related Private Equity (P/E) deals and real 
estate-related infrastructure projects. As both of these businesses brought GFH, 

eventually, to its knees, we will examine here the results of heavy real estate 
development concentration on the bank’s operating profit. To begin with, the bank’s 
operating activities generated a 2009 net loss of nearly US$728m of which US$607 
was announced in the last quarter (Fitch, 2010). Compared to 2008, there was a 
decline of approximately 350% in the net income (net income in 2008 US$292m). 
 
Perhaps GFH’s end-of-year results can symbolize the property bust in the GCC 
region. For example, due to an impairment loss in 2009 the bank ´s total assets fell 
from US$3.49 in 2008 to US$ 1.64 billion at the end of December 2009 (a drop of 
53%, or nearly $2 billion). The amount for the impairment allowance represented an 
increase of 1539% compared to 2008 (approximately US$ 40 million) and an increase 
of 4273 % in comparison to 2007 (around US$15 million) (GFH Financial Statement, 
2009). 
 
As one would expect these massive asset impairment provisions affect the bank’s 
ability to fulfil its commitments on current headline projects like Dubailand and at 
least three of their four Energy city projects (Qatar, Libya, Kazakhstan and India), if 
not all four. For its Dubai property project, for example, the bank was forced to book 
a provision of US$270 million (Soorani, 2010). Because of the dramatic decline in 
real estate values throughout the Gulf region the project (started in 2004) was 
suspended. Today, despite having been suspended the project still represents a large 
asset on the bank´s balance sheet (Goeksenin, 2009).  
 
The remaining US$305 million provisions are booked on the bank’s exposure to 
infrastructure projects including the Energy Cities, industrial companies, recreational 
parks (Lost Paradise), and investment in funds and financial institutions (Injazat 
Capital Limited and Qinvest) (Soorani, 2010). It is worth of mentioning that GFH is 
currently the project manager for most of these projects (undertaken through SPVs) 
and hence the fate of these projects might depend on the survival of GFH. This could 
represent a much bigger risk not only for GFH and its projects, but also for the 
broader Bahraini banking sector. 
 
As a final note, it’s worth mentioning that GFH write offs in 2007 and 2008 were very 
modest compared to the 2009 write offs.  This leads one to suspect that the bank may 
have been mis-stating the true value of its assets.  The global financial crisis was fully 
evident by the end of 2007, and by the end of 2008 there were almost no investment 
sectors worldwide that had not experienced dramatic value declines.  U.S. and 
European private equity firms openly stated in their year-end financial statements that 
assets declined anywhere from 15% to 25% or more.  Yet despite this GFH declared 
only US$15,362,000 write offs of asset values in 2007, and only US$39,127,000 in 
2008.  Then, perhaps finally forced to admit the true losses of GFH assets, valuations 
were written down a total of US$655,598,000 in the 2009 fiscal year. 
 
Of course this is simply speculation. There is no evidence of wrongdoing, and GFH’s 
financial statements were prepared by an independent accounting firm.  But, the 
apparently very late announcement of massive impairments does leave one to 
question the company’s responsiveness to shareholders, investors, regulators and the 
public generally. 
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By analysing the background of 2009 losses, we can deduce that a) GFH was in the 
middle of an unprecedented real estate valuation collapse following an equally 
unprecedented real estate valuation bubble, and b) that GFH had a majority of nearly 
every aspect of its valuation and business model tied to real estate. Unfortunately for 
GFH there seems to have been no pre-crisis efforts to diversify the business away 
from a single sector, and a single type of earnings.   
 
GFH faced four traditional risks: market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk and credit 
risk. Its absence of any meaningful diversification amplified some of those risks, but 
especially market and liquidity risks (Goeksenin, 2009). GFH also faced sector 
concentration risk.  This risk is especially when looking at the bank‘s asset 
distribution. In 2009, 83,4 % of total assets (US$1.64 million) were concentrated in 
the GCC countries, whereas 16.6% were in MENA, Asia, Europe and the United 
States (GFH Financial Statement, 2009). The same asset concentration can be applied 
for the year 2008, when GFH reported 78.5% of assets were in the GCC region. 
 
GFH’s operational risks including exit risk and the reputation risk, especially 
important given the bank’s very difficult situation now in a sluggish business 
environment. Credit risk on the other hand only played a minor role in the fall of GFH 
as the bank acts as an intermediary between regional investors and the investment 
projects in which GFH guides their money.  GFH had, in fact, probably very little 
actual cash in any of the deals it sponsored, instead funding its minority positions with 
what became known in Bahrain and the region as the “premium” (see more on this 
below), and was therefore less at risk (Goeksenin, 2009). 

 
With the above is being said, it is clear that GFH had a volatile earnings stream and 
was far from diversifying away from private equity investments in brand-new real 
estate projects that were years away from generating cash flow. Unfortunately GFH’s 
public relations department provides a somewhat misleading view. “This agreement 
[referring to a loan renegotiation] is indicative of lenders’ confidence in GFH’s 
business model, its ability to generate sustained revenue and return to profitability” 
said GFH Chairman Dr. Esam Janahi (Arab Times, 2010). His argument can be easily 
refuted by a glance at the bank’s financial statements; the business was not 
sustainable at all. This can be proven, by looking at the revenues and expenses over a 
period of 5 years (see graph 1). 
 

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In the above graph we see a company with growing revenue and profits, up until the 
fateful year of 2009.  Losses in 2009 almost wipe out the previous four years of 
profits, and in fact wipe out all profits and generate a cumulative loss when one 
assumes zero value for the footnoted item, “Income from receiving shares in 
companies in which the bank invested, in lieu of cash,“ a line item that variously 
provided from 8% to 30% of annual revenue, but delivered no cash: 
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


As mentioned above, most of GFH’s deals were private equity which comprising 
never less than 70% of its revenue. It should have been abundantly clear to 
management that any annual failure in the bank’s private equity business would 
directly result in the failure of GFH. Therefore, in order to comprehend the fall of 
GFH, it is important to understand the basic mechanism of private equity, as well as 
the adaptation of private equity used by GFH. 
 
According to IFSL (2009, p.2) “Private equity is a broad term that refers to any type 
of equity investment in an asset in which the equity is not freely tradable on a public 
stock market. This also includes public companies that are delisted as part of the 
transaction.” 
 
The fund raising process begins when private equity houses establish a special-
purpose vehicle (a "fund“) then raise capital from institutional investors, such as 
pension funds, and high net worth individual.  These investors are collectively 
referred to as limited partners (LPs, although GFH did not necessarily use the GP/LP 
structure, it was essentially the same). The year in which the capital is raised and 
invested for a given transaction is known as that transaction‘s "vintage“ year.  Once 
set up a fund is generally closed to new investment. A private equity firm’s track 
record on previous funds will drive its ability to raise capital for future funds.  The 
general partners (GPs)—the private equity firms—invest this capital according to a 
business plan approved by the LPs in the process of raising the money.  To increase 
the impact of the investment in a target company or real estate project the GP often 
borrows from banks and other lenders on behalf of the fund. 
 
Once the value-adding process has finished and the private equity firm believes that it 
has increased the business’ efficiencies—usually in 5 to 7 years—the GP seeks an exit 
to realise returns on the investments made by the LPs. The main exit routes include 
trades sales, repurchase, refinancing and floatation on a public exchange (BVCA, 
2010). 
 
Most private equity firms, set up as private partnerships, charge the investors an initial 
purchase fee equal to 1.5 to 2.0 percent of assets committed, and then an annual 
management fee of about the same amount, which is supposed to be used to finance 
operations of the private equity firm (salaries, office rent and other day to day costs) 
(Private Equity Council, 2007). Typically a private equity house will seek an overall 
return in terms of an annual internal rate of return (IRR), calculated over the life of 
the investment, of above 20 percent per annum. Although the return will depend on 
the risk of the investment, generally the higher the risk the higher the return that is 
expected (BVCA, 2010). 
 
It is important to note that private equity is almost always totally illiquid as capital is 
usually locked up for the 5 to 7 year period, but it is not unusual for investments to be 

locked up for ten years until there is an exit.  Historically, and in retrospect we know 
why, private equity firms in the United States and elsewhere occasionally delivered 
profits of 15% to 25% per year to their investors. What was often unsaid, however, 
was the frequency of failure in the industry.  A study by Bain & Co. revealed that "40 
percent of private equity deals fail to earn returns that even cover their original 
acquisition costs....”(Goliath 2007). 
Sophisticated investors know this.  They will seek private equity firms that have a 
solid track record, and they will diversify their investments among funds at one 
private equity firm, and then among several private equity firms. Very sophisticated 
institutional investors will also maintain minimal amounts of total private equity 
investments.  According to one report, global private equity was equal to only 1.2% of 
all private wealth under management (Sandwick, 2008).  A private equity firm itself 
will also try to achieve diversification.  It will spread its talent and resources among 
several funds in various industries, plus as is often the case it will branch into other 
lines of business to reduce total reliance solely on private equity (such as at 
Investcorp, also in Bahrain). This will facilate dispersion of risk and spread the 
financial faliure of a venture over the total investment held by the fund and ultimatelt 
over all the individual investors. ( Wouters, n.d.) 
As seen above, there is very little structural distinction between conventional private 
equity funds (CPEF) and Islamic private equity funds (IPEF). 
 
Similar to CPEF, IPEFs will invest in the underlying target companies and will upon 
the future exit incur losses or gain profits, which are passed on to investors.  They also 

charge identical purchase commissions and management fees, and they always add a 
performance fee to the final return if profits are above some minimum threshhold.  
The performance fee is generally 15% to 20% of the total return to investors above 
say 5%.  The point here is that the CPEF does not achieve a major payout until it 
successfully exits an investment.  The objectives of the CPEF (or GP), in other words, 
is closely aligned with the objectives of LP investors. 
 
IPEF can be distinguished from CPEF in several other ways, such as investment 
techniques excluding the use of conventional debt for buyouts or conventional project 
debt (although Islamic credit facilities can and are substituted for conventional debt). 
One substantial difference is the inclusion of a Shariah supervisory board (SSB), one 
of whose several functions is to list eliminating criteria’s used for short listing target 
companies. 

 
Understanding the conventional Private Equity model helps us understand the 
modifications of this model used by GFH. In general , GFH pioneered in the GCC 
region the addition of an large upfront fee, a relatively large amount of money at the 
time GFH made its Private Equity invesment on behalf of LP investors.  This is 
unique and, to our knowledge, unprecedented in the Private Equity industry 
anywhere. 
 
GFH would normally find a target investment, most often a greenfield real estate 
project but also companies or pools of real estate in Europe or North America.  It was 
then taken under GFH’s control, either through direct acquisition of the asset on 
GFH’s balance sheet, or control of the project through an SPV created by GFH. 
 
GFH would then create a fund offering memorandum and send its sales force out to 
meet LP investors.  Happy with the investment prospectus the investors would then 
transfer money to GFH.  A new SPV created by GFH, or the previous SPV, would 
then transfer majority ownership of the asset to the LP investors. 
 
Until this point the process was in line with industry standards.  However, it appears 
GFH would charge a "premium“ to LP investors.  Say, for example, GFH bought a 
mid-sized American company for $10 per share.  It would then sell a majority of its 
position to the LP investors for $15 per share, making an immediate 50% profit on its 
investment.  Sometimes this was done in an all cash transaction, sometimes in a 
combination of cash and the above-mentioned “Income from receiving shares in 
companies in which the bank invested, in lieu of cash.“  This extra bonus became 
commonly known as the "premium.“ 

 
In effect, money acquired from LP investors for real estate projects and other private 
equity investments was a charged the exit fee, or performance fee, in advance, a pre-
exit fee ( Maktoob Business, 2010). The GFH model for charging the performance fee 
in advance became widely emulated throughout the GCC region, used by peer firms 
Arcapita, Addax, GBCorp, and many other.  This was to our knowledge unique in the 
world industry of private equity. It seems to be a extremely  profitable strategy as the 
GPs (GFH in our case) made enormous profits on an investment using LP money 
before a successful exit.  Oddly enough, all of GFH’s investments with LPs also 
carried a performance fee, which would if the investment was successful truly deliver 
enormous profits to GFH. 
 
This kind of lopsided fee structure was obscured in part because of the very favorable 
market conditions that existed during the boom years of late 2002 through 2007, when 
asset prices were inflating everywhere, but in particular in real estate.  However, it 
would only take a modest crisis to expose the inequal application of GFH’s fees.  
With a recession and deflating asset values GFH would ultimately have to disclose 
substantial capital loss to its investors.  And, that is precisely what has happened. 
 
During the boom years GFH launched a series private equity and real estate projects.  
In the table below we can see the annual income from investment banking activities, 
which were by far the vast majority of revenue at GFH.  Income is broken into two 
line items, cash and shares, both received as fees for GFH activities.  Since GFH 
exited very few investments during this time period we can assume nearly all the 
revenue was from buying assets, not managing or selling them.  Interestingly, GFH 
chose to accept a large volume of revenue in the form of shares in the SPVs it created. 
                         

     


     

But, GFH became highly exposed when the crisis hit.  Its private equity business 
ground to a halt.  Income from investment banking services collapsed, from a high of 
$453 million in 2008 to a low of $49 million just the next year.  Clearly GFH was 
unable to sustain revenue in its core line of business.  It was fully exposed to a single 
business line, private equity, and its revenue was dependent on LP investors 
continuing to accept the concept of the premium, which apparently they did not. 
As one would predict, actual management fees were a small minority of GFH’s 
revenue model.  The line item "Placement, arrangement & management fees“ was 
once as high as 12% of total revenue, but otherwise only in the mid to low single-digit 
percentage range.  Clearly GFH was not a sustainable enterprise without constant deal 
flow and buying assets with LP investor money. 


 
Our analysis shows that the GFH investment model implemented was not quite a 
private equity. The form may be private equity but the substance may not. GFH was 
undoubtedly engaged in the purchase and sale of assets, although it appears the large 
majority of its revenue was from purchasing or acquiring assets with LP investor 
funds, not exiting investments. Therefore, we like to theorise that GFH may have 
implemented a modified version of Murabaha in its Private Equity deals. 
 
A traditional Murabaha transaction under Shariah law must meet the conditions of a 
valid sale. In addition to that it is a requisite that the seller informs the buyer of the 
cost price of the subject matter and any additional cost and profit (which is pre 
agreed) it is intends to charge (Ayub, 2007). The only difference in GFH’s Murabaha 
model was that they did not disclose the profits it was charging on the projects to LP 
investors but rather valued them in a way that included profits and sold them to the LP 
investors through a fund. Hence, the pricing model used by GFH to price their deals 
can be linked to the type of model one would find in a Murabaha transaction.Indeed, 
This technique is flawed and its implication can be directly seen on the current 
financial condition of GFH. 


 
With the credit crisis GFH was not left unscathed as the Islamic investment bank 
wrote down $728 million in the year 2009. After examining these specific provisions, 
some Private Equity ventures, despite the lack of transparency from GFH‘s side, were 
included in the write-down such as Injazat Capital Limited. In a typical Private Equity 
deal the company does not commit its own money into the funds, investors do. GFH, 
following industry practice, placed little of its own money into any of the transactions 

it sponsored.  However, unlike common industry practice, GFH normally took a 
significant cash and shares at the beginning of each investment, or what became 
widely known as the premium. 
 
It was hard for us to justify how GFH suffered losses from its Private Equity deals as 
there was some lack of disclosure on the innovative mechanism used these deals. 
Nonetheless, we managed to come out with a logical explanation after discussions 
with various bankers, including John A. Sandwick ,a specialist in Islamic finance in 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
GFH committed little or no of its own funds into the Private Equity SPVs it sponsored 
over the years, yet ended up holding significant minority positions in all of them via 
the premium. Perhaps GFH used these large minority positions to make LP investors 
confident becuase the bank had the appearance of being in line with the expectations 
and objectives of the LP investors, although they may not have known the size and 
extent of GFH’s rewards on entering a transaction, or its "premium.“ This strategy 
backfired when the various GFH SPVs collapsed in value, which appears to finally 
have been fully disclosed in the 2009 financial statements. 
 
While GFH suffered enormous balance sheet losses from writing off large amounts of 
its previously-earned "premium“ shares, it also began losing money on an operating 
basis, too. 
                         
     
The chart above shows GFH’s core operating expenses.  They were a modest $82 
million in 2005, but ballooned around 280% just two years later, and almost 350% in 
three years.  One has to wonder whether the GFH management was fully aware of the 
company’s ongoing high and ever-increaing fixed cost structure in light of the 
fragility of its revenue model, a model designed solely on the company’s ability to 
raise private investor money and buy assets to gain a large premium. 
 

Certainly GFH tried to cut costs.  That is evident in the 2009 figures, where staff costs 
were cut almost 80%.  If this was not due to staff reductions then it was due to huge 
shrinkages in the pay packages received by employees. 
 
But, having built a machine that fed on the premium GFH was unable to stave off the 
credit crisis any longer.  The nearly $730 million in losses in 2009 for a firm that had 
unreasonably high profits in all previous years indicates the party was over.  GFH had 
finally come down to earth. 

Probably one of the most important lessons in the GFH case is the fact the bank could 
not manage to diversify its business model prudently. “With GFH, they don’t have a 
business model at this point and their revenue streams have dried up. The balance 
sheet is a mess and they don’t have sufficient liquidity to meet near-term refinancing,” 
said Karthik Sankaran, an analyst at Bank of America Merrill Lynch who covers the 
company’s stock (Fitch, 2010). The bank mainly relies on the intermediation of 
greenfield real estate and investments in infrastructure projects. The figures for 2005 
to 2009 show that there was no real diversification in the business income sources. In 
each of the years under review revenue from investment advisory service/investment 
banking services and “Income from receiving shares in companies in which the bank 
invested, in lieu of cash” vastly greater than the revenues received in any other line of 
business (see Appendix, Gulf Finance House Income Statement 2005 to 2009).  This 
lack of diversification, and the heavy reliance on the premium, was finally GFH’s 
undoing. 
Retail banks differ from investment banks as they rely on depositors to fund them, 
whereas the latter depends on first and foremost a pool of eager LP investors, and 
later on wholesale deposits and term loans or bonds.  This is identical in Islamic 
banking, where retail Islamic banks rely on customer deposits and Islamic investment 
banks rely on LP investors, wholesale deposits and term Islamic credits or sukuk to 
fund their activities. 
 
GFH‘s management failure was evident in the rollover of term Islamic credits. We 
suspect LP investors simply stopped investing in GFH transactions sometime in 2007, 

and had significantly slowed the flow of new money even earlier.  To feed its expense 
machine and make new investments GFH seems to have began relying on wholesale 
markets and Islamic term credits and sukuk to finance its business.  We saw the 
extreme difficulty GFH had to refinance these debts when they came due, where it 
was nearly impossible to simply rollover existing facilities.  This is because lenders 
saw that GFH had most of its assets in very long-term investments, none or few of 
which could be sold to meet cash requirements.  The company was completely 
illiquid. 
GFH was caught off-guard when the credit crisis hit as it was difficult to refinance 
debts coming to maturity and difficult or impossible to exit from investments to 
unlock liquidity, all during a market where liquidity had dried up and asset valuations 
had collapsed.  Indeed,  GFH would need longer-term funding sources and new 
business activity because its debt structure is short-term and operating cash flow is 
minimal (Standard and Poor’s, 2010). 
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In the fourth quarter of 2008 GFH began to feel the heat of the financial crisis as they 
witnessed a plunge in income from placement fees. For nine years, high-net-worth 
individuals were pouring funds into GFH’s Private Equity deals and suddenly these 
funds came to standstill. GFH suffered from what appeared to be a reputational risk in 
2008 and most certainly in 2009, as investors came to realize the full extent of their 
losses after property markets crashed. 
Further explanation for that can be that GFH was good in buying assets, not from 
managing or exiting assets.  Huge portions of its private client funds are still tied up in 
these totally illiquid Private Equity ventures. Clearly LP investors had had enough, as 
GFH did not manage to sponsor a single major deal in 2009, and where its investment 
banking income (which we presume still mostly comprised of the fabled "premium“) 
was only $48 million compared with $323 million the previous year and $355 million 
two years earlier. Without doubt when Private Equity asset purchases represent the 
large majority of one‘s business, as was the case with GFH, then definitely one’s 
revenue stream will be disrupted at the first hint of recession. 
 
As mentioned above, when fresh funds stop flowing in from private investors and a 
large fixed cost base exists, there is little choice for an investment bank like GFH but 
to borrow from the markets.  GFH seems to have replaced private investor funding 
with a $200 million sukuk and two Islamic loans (reverse Murabahah and Wakalah) 
from other lenders in the 2008 and 2009 fiscal years. 
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Beginning in 2010, and coupled with its inability to raise fresh funds, GFH was 
clearly in a financial distress situation. GFH’s Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
dropped to 12.9% as of December 2009 (16.1% at December 2008), marginally 
higher than the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB)’s 12.0% requirement (Soorani, 2010). 
The bank’s auditors (KPMG) have also pointed out the low CAR level in their audit 
report. A low CAR restricts GFH’s ability to absorb possible future losses or take 
additional exposure, unless capital is increased (Soorani, 2010). 
After registering the biggest loss ever for an Islamic financial institution last year, 
GFH knew that the wholesale loan and sukuk markets would remain largely closed to 
Bahrain's off-shore investment houses ( khnifer, 2010). In September 2009, it 
sponsored a $300 million recapitalization, but the cash was quickly disbursed and 
again by year’s end GFH was known to have almost no cash left.  GFH then 
announced it replaced a $300 million Murabahah loan that matured in February 2010 
with a new $100 million facility with a maturity of six months, having repaid the 
other $200 million (khnifer, 2010). But for a financial distress institution, the newly 
renegotiated terms were quite high. It was reported then that GFH was paying a profit 
rate of 500 basis points over LIBOR and an extension fee of 100 bps for its $100 
million, six-month syndicated loan (khnifer, 2010). 
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In a region that sits on the world’s largest oil reserves, it was uncommon to have a 
sub-investment rating (i.e., lower than BBB-) for a banking entity, but GFH came to 
define that concept. In a move that might be interpreted as misleading for retail 
investors, GFH’s public relations department was marketing the completed 
renegotiation of $300 million Murabahah loan as a "success.“ However, Standard and 
Poor’s had another view. Right after hailing the renegotiations as a success on 10 
February 2010, the international rating agency lowered its long- and short-term 
counterparty credit ratings on GFH to SD/SD (selective default) from CC/C. "Under 
our criteria, we consider GFH's maturity extension to be a 'distressed exchange' and 
therefore tantamount to a default, because the new maturity represents a change to the 
facility's originally scheduled payment terms," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst 
Emmanuel Volland (Standard and Poor’s, 2010). An 'SD' rating is assigned when 
Standard & Poor's believes that the obligor has selectively defaulted on a specific 
issue or class of obligations ( khnifer, 2010). For a business model that relies on 
raising funds from clients and place it in its ventures this represents an enormous blow 
to reputations and credibility, as well as the ability to raise fresh capital. 
 
In February 2010 GFH was in a critical financial position as it was one notch away 
from D (Default), but not for long. On 3 March 2010 Standard and Poor‘s raised its 
GFH rating to CCC-/C from SD/SD with negative outlook.  "The rating action 
follows GFH's completion of the partial extension of maturity of a $100 million 
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facility which is set to be repaid in five installments over the next two years," said 
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Goeksenin Karagoez (Standard and Poor’s, 2010). 
This was barely a move in the right direction, but once again GFH’s public relations 
department declared the modest improvement a success.  S&P was more pessimistic, 
having deemed the bank to have very weak liquidity position from a rating standpoint 
because it still faces challenges to meet debt repayments coming due in the very near 
term (khnifer, 2010). 
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It is commonly known that one of the indirect cost of being in a financial distress 
situation is laying off  staff. GFH was no exception. Recently statements say that GFH 
aims to cut expenses by between 40 and 45 per cent, and has already laid off nearly 
100 people, consolidated its nine floors of office space in the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour and cancelled last year’s bonuses (Fitch, 2010). In an attempt to survive, 
GFH officials have outlined an aggressive plan to sell off assets, cut costs and move 
into new business areas. (Martin, 2010). However, it is unlikely for the bank to get 
optimal prices for selling its assets which may result in driving the institution to to 
further impairments and potential losses (Soorani, 2010). S&P, on the other hand, 
remains uncertain regarding GFH‘s ability to implement its plan for improving its 
liquidity position and boosting its revenues. S&P went on to give a direct threat by 
saying that “failure to meet any of the upcoming existing or restructured payments 
would lead us to lower the ratings to D (Standard and Poor’s, 2010). 
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